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Abstract—The problem of secret-key based authentication
under a privacy constraint on the source sequence is considered.
The identifier measurements during authentication are assumed
to be controllable via a cost-constrained “action” sequence.
Single-letter characterizations of the optimal trade-off among the
secret-key rate, storage rate, privacy-leakage rate, and action cost
are given for the four problems where noisy or noiseless measure-
ments of the source are enrolled to generate or embed secret keys.
The results are relevant for several user-authentication scenarios
including physical and biometric authentications with multiple
measurements. Our results include, as special cases, new results
for secret-key generation and embedding with action-dependent
side information without any privacy constraint on the enrolled
source sequence.
Index Terms—Private authentication, information theoretic
security, action dependent privacy, hidden source.
I. INTRODUCTION
WE study a problem of private authentication based onkey generation or embedding, motivated by emerging
technologies such as biometric authentication [2] and key
generation from physical unclonable functions (PUFs) [3]. The
system consists of an encoder and a decoder that observe
different measurements of an identifier output and want to
agree on a key, secret from an eavesdropper.
Replacing biometric identifiers is generally impossible [4],
and replacing physical identifiers is expensive or unappealing,
for instance, if the new identifier outputs and the replaced
ones are dependent. Therefore, for such applications, privacy
of the identifier output is of significant importance because
the biometric or physical source is closely related to the
identity of a person or a device. There exists a fundamental
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trade-off between privacy and security performance of an
authentication system. An information theoretic formulation
provides a framework to capture such a trade-off [4], [5].
Moreover, the identifier measurements can be controlled or
tuned with an additional cost. In this work, we study the
optimal trade-offs among the secret-key rate, public storage
rate, privacy-leakage rate, and expected action cost for discrete
memoryless sources and measurement channels. Availability
of post-processing methods in, e.g., [6] to obtain memoryless
channels and sources from biometric or physical identifiers
allows us to not consider channels with memory and correlated
sources, which are considered, e.g., in [7] and [8].
A. Motivation
The use of authentication for access control is an effective
method to ensure information security. Unlike concealing the
data to be transmitted [9], authentication of a user by using a
secret requires correlated random variables in order to agree on
a sequence [10], [11]. Most important physical identifiers used
for device authentication are PUFs, e.g., random variations in
ring oscillator (RO) outputs or in speckle patterns of optical to-
kens when irradiated by a laser. Similarly, body traits like irises
and fingerprints are used as biometric randomness sources for
authentication. There are code constructions in the biometric
secrecy literature proposed for authentication, e.g., the fuzzy-
vault scheme [12], fuzzy-commitment scheme [13], and (code-
offset) fuzzy extractors [14]. It is shown in [15] that the fuzzy-
commitment scheme and fuzzy extractors are suboptimal for
a simplified version of the private authentication problem
we consider in this work. Accordingly, we are interested in
understanding the fundamental limits of private authentication
by studying optimal code constructions and their rate regions.
Motivated by the use of biometric or physical identifiers
that involve different forms of measurements, e.g., the use
of multiple measurements or variations in the quality of
the measurement process [16], [17], we consider a new
private authentication model where the measurement process
is represented by a cost-constrained action-dependent side
information acquisition, where an action sequence determines
the measurement channel. A high action cost can, for instance,
represent the use of a high quality measurement device.
There are two canonical models for private authentication:
generated-secret model and chosen-secret model. We first
consider the generated-secret model, where the secret key is
generated from the identifier outputs. The secret key recon-
structed at the decoder is generally stored in a trusted database.
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It can therefore be practical to embed a uniformly-distributed
and independently chosen secret key into the encoder rather
than generating it from identifier outputs [4]. The encoder
binds the key to the identifier outputs in order to provide
private authentication at the decoder. We also consider this
practical model, called the chosen-secret model, with cost-
constrained actions and show that its general implication is an
increased need of storage. Remark that the fuzzy-commitment
scheme and fuzzy extractors are realizations of, respectively,
the chosen- and generated-secret models.
Biometric and physical identifier outputs are noisy by
nature. For instance, a cut in the palm corresponds to noise
on the palmprint. Similar to multiple-antenna systems, mul-
tiple identifier measurements at the decoder can therefore
significantly improve the rate regions as compared to a single
measurement. Suppose we have multiple measurements also
at the encoder, which assumes that the source is hidden or
remote. A hidden or remote source represents that the encoder
observes one or multiple noisy measurements of a source
rather than the source output. It is shown in [18] that if a
visible source is mistakenly assumed for system design, there
can be unnoticed secrecy leakages and the reliability at the
decoder can decrease. Motivated by these results, we study
also hidden identifiers with cost-constrained actions for the
generated- and chosen-secret models.
B. Summary of Contributions and Organization
In [18], the enlargements of the rate regions due to in-
creasing multiplicity of noisy measurements of a hidden
source are illustrated. An attacker with access to a correlated
identifier measurement tries to deceive the authentication in
[19]. We combine and extend the models in [18] and [19],
and consider a cost-constrained action sequence that controls
the source measurements during authentication to reconstruct
the secret key. In this work, the secret key can be either
generated or embedded. Multiple identifier measurements both
at the encoder and decoder are also possible by considering
a hidden identifier. Similar to [19], correlated information at
the eavesdropper is also considered here unlike in [4], [5], and
[18], which is a realistic assumption especially for biometric
identifiers. The key-storage-leakage-cost region for secret-key
generation from an identifier with a cost-constrained action at
the decoder and a noiseless (visible) output at the encoder is
given first in the conference version of this paper [1]. This rate
region recovers several results in the literature including the
key-leakage rate regions for a visible source in [4] and [5].
In this work, we further study the following extensions and
the main contributions are as follows.
• We extend the region for key generation to a chosen
secret-key embedding scenario, where the source output
is used to conceal the chosen secret key.
• For a hidden source, we show that the key-storage-
leakage-cost region is significantly different from the vis-
ible source model for both key generation and embedding
scenarios. Comparisons among these regions illustrate
that an incorrect system model could result in secrecy
and reliability threats.
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Fig. 1. A visible source: (a) represents the generated-secret model with
the encoder f (n)1 (·) and (b) represents the chosen-secret model with the
encoder f (n)2 (·, ·). The decoder and EVE measurements can be performed
after observing the action sequence.
• As an example, we use realistic channel and source
models to generate secret keys from PUFs and illustrate
the key-leakage trade-off for a binary physical identifier
with cost-constrained actions during authentication.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe
the source models and the generated- and chosen-secret mod-
els. We develop the key-storage-leakage-cost regions for the
four problems, and compare them with each other and previous
results in Section III. An achievable key-storage-leakage-cost
region for a binary source with cost-constrained measurements
during authentication is illustrated in Section IV.
C. Notation
Upper case letters represent random variables and lower
case letters their realizations. Superscripts denote a string of
variables, e.g., Xn =X1 . . . Xi . . . Xn, and subscripts denote
the position of a variable in a string. Xn\i represents the
vector (X1, X2, . . . , Xi−1, Xi+1, . . . , Xn). A random variable
X has probability distribution PX . Calligraphic letters such as
X denote sets and their sizes are written as |X |. A set, e.g.,
Xn, with superscript n denotes an n-fold product-distribution
set, and a set, e.g., W(n), with superscript in parentheses
(n) denotes a set whose size grows with the superscript n.
T n (·) denotes the set of length-n letter-typical sequences
with respect to the positive number  [20, Ch. 3], [21].
X − Y − Z indicates that (X,Y, Z) forms a Markov chain.
Hb(x) = −x log x− (1−x) log(1−x) is the binary entropy
function and H−1b (·) denotes its inverse with range [0, 0.5].
The ∗-operator is defined as p∗x=p(1−x)+(1−p)x.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATIONS
We define the four problems in the following.
A. Visible Source, Generated-secret Model
Consider the system model in Fig. 1(a). The source X , mea-
surements Y,Z , and action A alphabets are finite sets. Let Xn
be a length-n sequence which has independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) components distributed according to some
fixed distribution PX . Authentication has two phases. First, a
user enrolls the source sequence Xn in the system to generate
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the helper data W and the secret key K. A cost-constrained
action sequence An is chosen based on W to control quality
or reliability of the measurements during the authentication,
during which (Y n, Zn) are generated as outputs of a given
memoryless channel PY Z|XA with inputs Xn and An. The
sequence Y n here represents a controllable measurement (side
information) while Zn is another correlated side information.
Based on W and measurement Y n, the decoder reconstructs
the secret key Kˆ. Authentication is successful if Kˆ = K. For
generality, we consider an eavesdropper (EVE) who has access
to the description W and correlated side information Zn.
Definition 1. A (|W(n)|, |K(n)|, n)-code Cn for private au-
thentication with a key generated from a visible source,
controllable decoder measurements, and a noiseless encoder
measurement consists of
• an encoder f (n)1 : Xn →W(n) ×K(n),
• an action encoder: f (n)a :W(n) → An,
• a decoder g(n) :W(n) × Yn → K(n). ♦
Definition 2. A key-storage-leakage-cost tuple
(Rk, Rw,∆, C) ∈ R4+ is said to be achievable for a
visible source with the generated-secret model if for any
δ > 0 there is some n≥1 and a (|W(n)|, |K(n)|, n)-code for
which Rk =
log |K(n)|
n
such that
Pr[Kˆ 6= K] ≤ δ, (reliability) (1)
1
n
I(K;W,Zn) ≤ δ (secrecy) (2)
1
n
H(K) ≥ Rk − δ (uniformity) (3)
1
n
log
∣∣W(n)∣∣ ≤ Rw + δ (storage) (4)
1
n
I(Xn;W,Zn) ≤ ∆ + δ (privacy) (5)
E[Γ(n)(An)] ≤ C + δ (cost) (6)
where we have (W,K) = f (n)1 (X
n), An = f (n)a (W ), Kˆ =
g(n)(W,Y n), and Γ(n)(·) is a cost function with Γ(n)(An)=
1
n
∑n
i=1 Γ(Ai). The key-storage-leakage-cost region Rgs is
the closure of the set of all achievable tuples. ♦
B. Visible Source, Chosen-secret Model
Consider the problem of binding a secret key to a visible
identifier, illustrated in Fig. 1(b). The decoder observes cost-
constrained controllable measurements during authentication,
whereas the encoder observes the noiseless source outputs.
Definition 3. A
(|W(n)|, |K(n)|, n)-code Cn for private au-
thentication with an embedded key concealed by a visible
source, controllable decoder measurements, and a noiseless
encoder measurement consists of
• an encoder f (n)2 : Xn ×K(n) →W(n),
• an action encoder f (n)a :W(n) → An,
• a decoder g(n) :W(n) × Yn → K(n). ♦
Definition 4. A key-storage-leakage-cost tuple
(Rk, Rw,∆, C) ∈ R4+ is said to be achievable for a
visible source with the chosen-secret model if for any δ > 0
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Fig. 2. A hidden source: (a) represents the generated-secret model with
the encoder f (n)3 (·) and (b) represents the chosen-secret model with the
encoder f (n)4 (·, ·). The decoder and EVE measurements can be performed
after observing the action sequence.
there is some n≥1 and a (|W(n)|, |K(n)|, n)-code for which
Rk =
log |K(n)|
n
such that (1)-(6) are satisfied, where we
have W = f (n)2 (X
n,K), An = f (n)a (W ), Kˆ = g(n)(W,Y n),
and Γ(n)(An) = 1n
∑n
i=1 Γ(Ai). The key-storage-leakage-cost
region Rcs is the closure of all achievable tuples. ♦
C. Hidden Source, Generated-secret Model
Consider the system model in Fig. 2(a), where a key
is generated from a hidden source. The decoder observes
cost-constrained controllable source measurements Y n during
authentication, whereas the encoder observes uncontrollable
noisy measurements X˜n of the hidden source outputs Xn
through a memoryless channel PX˜|X . The source alphabet X ,
the measurement alphabets X˜ ,Y,Z , and the action alphabet
A are finite sets.
Definition 5. A
(|W(n)|, |K(n)|, n)-code Cn for private au-
thentication with a key generated from noisy measurements
of a hidden source, controllable decoder measurements, and
noisy encoder measurements consists of
• an encoder f (n)3 : X˜n →W(n) ×K(n),
• an action encoder f (n)a :W(n) → An,
• a decoder g(n) :W(n) × Yn → K(n). ♦
Definition 6. A key-storage-leakage-cost tuple
(Rk, Rw,∆, C) ∈ R4+ is said to be achievable for a
hidden source with the generated-secret model if for any δ>0
there is some n≥1 and a (|W(n)|, |K(n)|, n)-code for which
Rk =
log |K(n)|
n
such that (1)-(6) are satisfied, where we
have (W,K) = f (n)3 (X˜
n), An = f (n)a (W ), Kˆ = g(n)(W,Y n),
and Γ(n)(An) = 1n
∑n
i=1 Γ(Ai). The key-storage-leakage-cost
region Rhgs is the closure of all achievable tuples. ♦
D. Hidden Source, Chosen-secret Model
Consider the problem of binding a chosen secret key to a
hidden biometric or physical identifier, as shown in Fig. 2(b).
The decoder observes cost-constrained controllable source
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measurements during authentication, whereas the encoder ob-
serves uncontrollable noisy source outputs.
Definition 7. A
(|W(n)|, |K(n)|, n)-code Cn for private au-
thentication with an embedded secret key concealed by noisy
measurements of a hidden source, controllable decoder mea-
surements, and noisy encoder measurements consists of
• an encoder f (n)4 : X˜n ×K(n) →W(n),
• an action encoder f (n)a :W(n) → An,
• a decoder g(n) :W(n) × Yn → K(n). ♦
Definition 8. A key-storage-leakage-cost tuple
(Rk, Rw,∆, C) ∈ R4+ is said to be achievable for a
hidden source with the chosen-secret model if for any δ > 0
there is some n≥1 and a (|W(n)|, |K(n)|, n)-code for which
Rk =
log |K(n)|
n
such that (1)-(6) are satisfied, where we
have W = f (n)4 (X˜
n,K), An = f (n)a (W ), Kˆ = g(n)(W,Y n),
and Γ(n)(An) = 1n
∑n
i=1 Γ(Ai). The key-storage-leakage-cost
region Rhcs is the closure of all achievable tuples. ♦
Remark. The encoder- and decoder-measurement channels in
Fig. 2 are modeled as two separate channels, i.e., X˜−(A,X)−
(Y,Z) forms a Markov chain. This is the case if, e.g., there
is a considerable amount of time between the encoder and
decoder measurements of a palmprint so that the cuts on it
during enrollment and authentication are independent.
III. KEY-STORAGE-LEAKAGE-COST REGIONS
We are interested in characterizing the optimal trade-off
among the secret-key rate, storage rate, privacy-leakage rate,
and expected action cost. We give the rate regions for all cases.
Theorem 1 (Visible Source, Generated-secret). For given PX
and PY Z|XA, the key-storage-leakage-cost regionRgs is given
as the set of all tuples (Rk, Rw,∆, C) ∈ R4+ satisfying
Rk ≤ I(V ;Y |A,U)− I(V ;Z|A,U) (7)
Rw ≥ I(X;A) + I(V ;X|A, Y ) (8)
∆≥I(X;A, V, Y )+I(X;Z|A,U)−I(X;Y |A,U) (9)
for some PXPA|XPY Z|XAPV |XAPU |V such that E[Γ(A)] ≤
C with |U| ≤ |X ||A|+2 and |V| ≤ (|X ||A|+2)(|X ||A|+1).
Proof: Achievability is based on a random coding scheme
that consists of superposition of a rate-distortion code for
communicating the action sequence and a layered coding with
binning for secret-key generation. The converse is based on
standard properties of entropy functions. The proof details are
given in Appendices A-B.
Theorem 2 (Visible Source, Chosen-secret). For given PX and
PY Z|XA, the key-storage-leakage-cost region Rcs is given as
the set of all tuples (Rk, Rw,∆, C) ∈ R4+ satisfying
Rk ≤ I(V ;Y |A,U)− I(V ;Z|A,U) (10)
Rw ≥ I(X;A, V )− I(U ;Y |A)− I(V ;Z|A,U) (11)
∆≥I(X;A, V, Y )+I(X;Z|A,U)−I(X;Y |A,U) (12)
for some PXPA|XPY Z|XAPV |XAPU |V such that E[Γ(A)]≤C
with |U|≤|X ||A|+ 2 and |V|≤(|X ||A|+ 2)(|X ||A|+ 1).
Proof: We use the proof of achievability for Theorem 1
and add a one-time padding step. We apply the codebook
generation and encoding steps of the generated-secret model to
generate the key K ′ and the helper data W ′. The embedded
chosen key K is uniformly distributed and independent of
other random variables. Compared to Theorem 1, the secret-
key and privacy-leakage rate bounds have the same expres-
sions, and the storage rate bound is the sum of the secret-key
and storage rate bounds of the generated-secret model. The
proof details are given in Appendices C-D.
Remark. The results in Theorems 1 and 2 include, as
special cases, results for one-round secret-key generation and
embedding, respectively, that extend the results in [10], where
there is no privacy constraint on the source sequence, i.e.,
∆ = ∆max = H(X) in Definitions 2 and 4, with action-
dependent side information. Moreover, Theorem 1 can also
be seen as an extension of the result in [19] because we ad-
ditionally capture cost-constrained action-dependent decoder
measurements.
Theorem 3 (Hidden Source, Generated-secret). For given PX ,
PX˜|X , and PY Z|XA, the key-storage-leakage-cost regionRhgs
is given as the set of all tuples (Rk, Rw,∆, C) ∈ R4+ satisfying
Rk ≤ I(V ;Y |A,U)− I(V ;Z|A,U) (13)
Rw ≥ I(X˜;A) + I(V ; X˜|A, Y ) (14)
∆≥I(X;A, V, Y )+I(X;Z|A,U)−I(X;Y |A,U) (15)
for some PXPX˜|XPA|X˜PY Z|XAPV |X˜APU |V such
that E[Γ(A)] ≤ C with |U| ≤ |X˜ ||A| + 3 and
|V|≤(|X˜ ||A|+ 3)(|X˜ ||A|+ 2).
Proof: Achievability proof is similar to Theorem 1. We
mainly modify the privacy-leakage analysis since the source
is now hidden. The proof is given in Appendices E-F.
Theorem 4 (Hidden Source, Chosen-secret). For given PX ,
PX˜|X , and PY Z|XA, the key-storage-leakage-cost region Rhcs
is given as the set of all tuples (Rk, Rw,∆, C) ∈ R4+ satisfying
Rk ≤ I(V ;Y |A,U)− I(V ;Z|A,U) (16)
Rw ≥ I(X˜;A, V )− I(U ;Y |A)− I(V ;Z|A,U) (17)
∆≥I(X;A, V, Y )+I(X;Z|A,U)−I(X;Y |A,U) (18)
for some PXPX˜|XPA|X˜PY Z|XAPV |X˜APU |V such
that E[Γ(A)] ≤ C with |U| ≤ |X˜ ||A| + 3 and
|V|≤(|X˜ ||A|+ 3)(|X˜ ||A|+ 2).
Proof: We use the proof of achievability for Theorem 3
and add a one-time padding step. The secret-key and privacy-
leakage rate bounds have the same expressions, and the new
storage rate bound is the sum of the secret-key and storage rate
bounds of the generated-secret model for a hidden source. The
proof details are given in Appendices G-H.
Remark. Theorems 3 and 4 can be seen as extensions of the
results in [18] with the addition of cost-constrained action-
dependent measurements at the decoder and correlated side
information at the eavesdropper.
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A. Rate Region Comparisons and Discussions
Consider the compression-leakage-key region given in [19,
Theorem 2] for the generated-secret model and a visible
source. We compare this region with the rate region Rgs to
illustrate the effects of the cost-constrained action sequence.
In particular, we observe that the action A appears as a
conditioning random variable in each mutual information term
in [19, Theorem 2], the new storage and privacy-leakage rate
limits are increased by the rate-distortion coding amount of
I(X;A), and the probability distribution of A is limited by an
expected cost constraint. Therefore, the cost-constrained action
sequence An brings the possibility of enlarging the rate region,
which recovers the rate region in [19, Theorem 2] by choosing
a constant action with fixed cost. The action sequence An has
similar effects on other rate regions.
The rate region Rgs differs from the rate region Rcs only in
the bound for the storage rate. The bound in (11) can be written
as I(X;A) + I(X;V |A, Y ) + I(V ;Y |A,U)− I(V ;Z|A,U)
(cf. (8)), revealing an additional rate that is I(V ;Y |A,U) −
I(V ;Z|A,U) (cf. (10)) needed to convey the chosen secret to
the decoder. Suppose (Rk, Rw,∆, C) ∈ Rcs for given PX and
PY Z|XA. Therefore, there exist A, U , and V such that U −
V − (X,A)− (Y,Z) forms a Markov chain as in Theorem 2.
It is straightforward to show that (Rk, Rw−Rk,∆, C) ∈ Rgs
for the same PX and PY Z|XA. Similar conclusions follow also
for a hidden source.
The bounds for the secret-key and privacy-leakage rates of
visible and hidden sources have the same expressions, i.e.,
for the generated-secret model in Rgs and Rhgs, and for the
chosen-secret model in Rcs and Rhcs, respectively. However,
the storage-rate limits of different source models are different.
Moreover, the Markov chain constraints and the cardinality
bounds on the auxiliary random variables are different for
visible and hidden source models. The rate regions therefore
differ significantly, which can result in unnoticed secrecy
leakages and reliability reductions if the wrong source model
is used for a system design (see [18]).
IV. EXAMPLE
We want to illustrate an achievable rate region for cost-
constrained action-dependent secret-key generation from a
visible source. We first define the scenario where a PUF in
an internet-of-things (IoT) device is used for key generation
so that only a mobile device with access to the key can control
the IoT device. We then show an achievable rate region for this
scenario by proving specific convexity results. These convexity
results significantly simplify the encoder design by decreasing
the cardinality of the auxiliary random variable.
Suppose X is binary and uniformly distributed, the channel
PA|X is a binary symmetric channel (BSC) with crossover
probability α, and the channels PY |AX(.|a, .) are BSCs with
crossover probabilities pa for a=0, 1. Suppose the eavesdrop-
per has degraded side information and the channel PZ|Y is a
BSC with crossover probability p. In practice, quantized fine
variations of ring oscillator (RO) outputs follow these source
and channel models. The effects of voltage and temperature
variations can also be suppressed by a legitimate user by
applying additional post-processing steps to the RO outputs
[6]. Classic crossover probabilities for the BSCs PY |AX(·|a, ·)
under ideal environmental conditions are pa = 0.03 and 0.05
for a = 0, 1, where, e.g., a = 0 corresponds to the case that
Xn is sent through the PY |AX(·|0, ·) channel.
Suppose the attacker has access to a noisy version Zn of
the RO outputs Xn disturbed by environmental variations in
addition to noise. A classic crossover probability for one of
the BSCs PZ|AX(·|a, ·) is p′=0.15 [6]. We thus choose p0 =
0.03, p1 = 0.05, p = 0.1277 so that p ∗ p0 = 0.15 = p′ and
p ∗ p1 =0.1649. We also consider the cost of Γ(0)=0.5 units
for a=0 and Γ(1)=0.3 units for a=1 since obtaining a more
reliable channel requires more post-processing steps, which
results in higher cost.
Suppose the crossover probability α of the BSC PA|X is
0.2. It is therefore more likely that the input X = 1 is sent
through a channel that is stochastically degraded with respect
to the channel through which the input X=0 is sent because
p1>p0. This is the case if, e.g., a one-bit quantizer is applied
to RO outputs, where the bit 0 is extracted if the output value
is less than the mean over all ROs and the bit 1 otherwise. RO
outputs decrease with increasing temperature. Therefore, the
error probability of the channel through which the input bit 0 is
sent is smaller than the bit 1 is sent if the ambient temperature
is greater than the temperature assumed for system design.
We now illustrate an achievable rate region for the RO PUF
problem defined above by proving convexity of a function used
for entropy calculations. First, fix V =(A,X) so that the rate
region is
Rk ≤ I(X;Y |A,U)− I(X;Z|A,U)
Rw ≥ I(X;A) +H(X|A, Y )
∆ ≥ H(X)− (I(X;Y |A,U)− I(X;Z|A,U)) (19)
such that U − (A,X) − (Y,Z) forms a Markov chain and
C ≥ E[Γ(A)]. The optimization problem of achieving bound-
ary points in (19) is equivalent to
min
PAX|U
H(Z|A,U) for a fixed H(Y |A,U)=η (20)
for all 0 ≤ η ≤ 1, which is a similar problem to Mrs. Ger-
ber’s lemma (MGL) [22]. Denote the conditional probabilities
PAX|U (ax|i) = xˆi,ax and the probabilities PU (i) = ui for
i=1, 2, . . . , |U|. Due to PAX , we obtain the constraints
|U|∑
i=1
uixˆi,01 =
|U|∑
i=1
uixˆi,10 =
α
2
, (21)
|U|∑
i=1
uixˆi,00 =
|U|∑
i=1
uixˆi,11 =
1−α
2
. (22)
To fix H(Y |A,U), it therefore suffices to consider
xˆi,01 =
1
2
−xˆi,00, xˆi,10 = 1
2
−xˆi,11. (23)
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Define the functions
f(xˆi,00, xˆi,11)=
[
Hb
(
p0 ∗ 2xˆi,00
1− 2(xˆi,11 − xˆi,00)
)
+Hb
(
p1 ∗ 2xˆi,11
1−2(xˆi,00 − xˆi,11)
)]
, (24)
g(xˆi,00, xˆi,11)=
[
Hb
(
p ∗ p0 ∗ 2xˆi,00
1− 2(xˆi,11 − xˆi,00)
)
+Hb
(
p∗ p1∗ 2xˆi,11
1−2(xˆi,00−xˆi,11)
)]
. (25)
Using (23), (24), and (25), we obtain
H(Y |A,U) =
|U|∑
i=1
ui
1
2
f(xˆi,00, xˆi,11), (26)
H(Z|A,U) =
|U|∑
i=1
ui
1
2
g(xˆi,00, xˆi,11). (27)
Define an inverse function f−1(ν) = (x¯, x¯) for all ν ∈
[Hb(p0)+Hb(p1), 2] and x¯ ∈ [0, 0.5]. It suffices to replace
f(xˆi,00, xˆi,11) and g(xˆi,00, xˆi,11), respectively, with
f¯(x¯) = f
( x¯
2
,
x¯
2
)
(28)
g¯(x¯) = g
( x¯
2
,
x¯
2
)
(29)
to fix (26) and (27) separately.
Lemma 1. There is a unique x¯ in the interval [0, 0.5] for
which H(Y |A,U)= 12 f¯(x¯).
Proof. The function f¯(x¯) is strictly increasing from Hb(p0)+
Hb(p1) to 2 in the interval [0, 0.5) and we have Hb(p0) +
Hb(p1)≤2H(Y |A,U)≤2H(Y )≤2.
Lemma 2. Define p˜′=min{p′, 1−p′} for some 0≤p′≤1. If
p˜ ∗ p˜0 ≥ p˜1 and p˜ ∗ p˜1 ≥ p˜0, the function g¯(f−1(ν)) is convex
in ν for ν∈ [Hb(p0)+Hb(p1), 2].
Proof. The functions f¯(x¯) and g¯(x¯) are symmetric with
respect to p0 = 12 , p1 =
1
2 , and p=
1
2 . It thus suffices to prove
the convexity for 0≤ p˜0, p˜1, p˜≤ 0.5. Define f¯ ′(x¯) = ddx¯ f¯(x¯).
g¯(f−1(ν)) is convex in ν if [23]
∂2
∂ν2
(
g¯(f−1(ν))
)
=
1
f¯ ′(x¯)
∂
∂x¯
(
g¯′(x¯)
f¯ ′(x¯)
)
≥0 (30)
for all x¯∈ [0, 0.5]. Note that Hb(·) is an increasing function
for x¯∈ [0, 0.5], so f¯ ′(x¯)≥0 for all x¯∈ [0, 0.5]. It thus suffices
to show that ∂∂x¯
(
g¯′(x¯)
f¯ ′(x¯)
)
≥0, i.e.,
g¯′′(x¯)f¯ ′(x¯)−f¯ ′′(x¯)g¯′(x¯)≥0. (31)
The functions f¯(x¯) and g¯(x¯) consist of two parts as Hb(p˜a∗
x¯) and Hb(p˜ ∗ p˜a ∗ x¯), respectively, for a=0, 1. It is shown in
[22] that Hb(p˜ ∗H−1b (ν)) is convex in 0≤ ν≤1 for any p˜∈
[0, 0.5], so the terms in (31) that consist of the multiplications
of the parts with the same p˜a provide positive contributions.
It thus suffices to find a set of p˜0 and p˜1 values that satisfies
1−2(p˜∗p˜a)
(p˜∗p˜a∗x¯)(1−p˜∗p˜a∗x¯) log
(
1−p˜∗p˜a∗x¯
p˜∗p˜a∗x¯
)
≤ 1−2p˜b
(p˜b∗x¯)(1−p˜b∗x¯) log
(
1−p˜b∗x¯
p˜b∗x¯
) (32)
where b=1−a for a=0, 1. Define the function
l(pˆ) =
1− 2pˆ
(pˆ∗x¯)(1−pˆ∗x¯) log
(
1−pˆ∗x¯
pˆ∗x¯
) (33)
for 0 ≤ pˆ, x¯ ≤ 0.5. It is straightforward to prove that l(pˆ)
is a decreasing function by showing that l(pˆ) is convex and
l′(0.5)=0. The inequality in (32) is thus satisfied if p˜∗p˜a≥ p˜b
for a=0, 1. This proves the convexity.
We use the convexity property for channels satisfying the
assumptions in Lemma 2 to give an achievable lower bound
for H(Z|A,U) when H(Y |A,U) is fixed.
Lemma 3. Suppose g¯(f−1(ν)) is convex in ν. With the
assumptions given above, we have
H(Z|A,U)≥ 1
2
g¯(f−1(2H(Y |A,U))). (34)
Proof. Using Jensen’s inequality, we have
H(Z|A,U)=
|U|∑
i=1
ui
1
2
g¯(f−1(f¯(x¯i)))
≥ 1
2
g¯
(
f−1
( |U|∑
i=1
uif¯(x¯i)
))
=
1
2
g¯
(
f−1(2H(Y |A,U))).
Lemma 4. Consider the problem setup defined above and
the region in (19). The BSCs PAX|U (a, ·|·) with the same
crossover probability x¯ ∈ [0, 0.5] when PAX|U (a, 0|·) +
PAX|U (a, 1|·) = 12 achieve the region that satisfies equality
in (34) if (23), p˜ ∗ p˜0≥ p˜1, and p˜ ∗ p˜1≥ p˜0 are satisfied.
Proof. Consider the boundary points in (19) that depend on
U . Using Lemma 3, we obtain
Rk≤ H(Y |A,U)−H(Y |A,X)
− 1
2
g¯
(
f−1(2H(Y |A,U)))+H(Z|A,X), (35)
∆≥ H(X)−H(Y |A,U)+H(Y |A,X)
+
1
2
g¯
(
f−1(2H(Y |A,U)))−H(Z|A,X) (36)
where we use Lemma 2 for the convexity requirement and
Lemma 1 to show that the inverse function f−1(·) is a bijective
mapping. Equalities in (35) and (36) are achieved by BSCs
PAX|U (a, ·|·) with crossover probability 0≤ x¯≤ 0.5, defined
in Lemma 1, when PAX|U (a, 0|·)+PAX|U (a, 1|·)= 12 .
Remark. One can show that the lower bound in (34) can be
improved for H(Z|A,U) given in (27) that is a function of a
general g(xˆi,00, xˆi,11), although this lower bound is tight for
the function g¯(x¯).
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For the RO PUF problem with the source and channel
parameters given above, we obtain Rw≥0.4731 bits/source-bit
and C≥0.4 units since PAXY Z is fixed. The boundary points
for Rk and ∆ sum up to H(X)=1 bits, which determines the
trade-off between the secret-key and privacy-leakage rates for
this example. The maximum Rk achievable by using Lemma 4
is R∗k = 0.3876 bits/source-bit, achieved with ∆ ≥ 0.6124
bits/source-bit.
V. CONCLUSION
We derived the key-storage-leakage-cost regions for a vis-
ible source with the generated- or chosen-secret model when
a cost-constrained action sequence controls the source mea-
surements during authentication. Correlated side information
at the eavesdropper is also considered as a realistic assumption
especially for biometric identifiers. The achievability proof of
the generated-secret model involves layered random binning.
We bound the secret key generated by the generated-secret
model to a chosen secret key for the proof of the chosen-
secret model. We illustrated achievable key-storage-leakage-
cost regions with an example, where used channel and source
parameters were motivated by realistic authentication scenar-
ios that use secret keys generated from RO PUFs.
Multiple source measurements during enrollment are stud-
ied by considering a hidden source with noisy measurements
at the encoder. We also derived the key-storage-leakage-cost
regions for such a hidden source. The achievability proofs
of the hidden source models also involve the same layered
random binning as of the visible source models, but this time
the noiseless identifier outputs are replaced with the noisy
outputs at the encoder and the privacy-leakage rate is measured
with respect to the hidden source.
Comparisons showed that the rate regions for the two source
models differ significantly due to different rate limits for
the storage rate, and different Markov chain constraints and
cardinality bounds on the auxiliary random variables. In future
work, we will consider adaptive decoder measurements with
causal actions that depend on the helper data and previous
decoder measurements, which might improve the rate regions.
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APPENDIX
PROOFS OF THEOREMS 1- 4
Based on the condition that all sequences are jointly typical
with high probability, we bound some conditional entropy
terms of interest with single letter expressions using the
following two lemmas (see [17] for proofs).
Lemma 5. Let (Xn, An) be jointly typical with high prob-
ability and Zn i.i.d. ∼ PZ|XA, we have H(Zn|Xn, An) ≥
n(H(Z|X,A) − δ), where δ → 0 as  → 0 and  → 0 as
n→∞.
Lemma 6. Let (An, Un, Zn) be jointly typical with high
probability and Cn represent a random codebook. Then,
H(Zn|An, Un, Cn) ≤ n(H(Z|A,U)+δ), where δ → 0 as
→ 0 and → 0 as n→∞.
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
A. Proof of Achievability
The proof follows from standard random coding arguments
where we show the existence of a code that satisfies the key,
storage, privacy-leakage rates, and expected cost constraints.
Codebook generation: Fix PA|XPV |XAPU |V such that
E[Γ(A)] ≤ C/(1 + ).
• Randomly and independently generate 2n(I(X;A)+δ)
codewords an(wa) according to
∏n
i=1 PA(ai(wa)) for
wa ∈ [1 : 2n(I(X;A)+δ)].
• For each wa, randomly and conditionally independently
generate 2n(I(U ;X|A)+δ) codewords un(wa,m) each
according to
∏n
i=1 PU |A(ui|ai(wa)) for m ∈ [1 :
2n(I(U ;X|A)+δ)], and distribute them uniformly at ran-
dom into 2n(I(U ;X|A)−I(U ;Y |A)+2δ) bins bU (wu) for
wu ∈ [1 : 2n(I(U ;X|A)−I(U ;Y |A)+2δ)]. Without loss of
generality, we can identify the index m = (wu,m′) for
some m′ ∈ [1 : 2n(I(U ;Y |A)−δ)].
• For each (wa,m) pair, randomly and conditionally
independently generate 2n(I(V ;X|A,U)+δ)
codewords vn(wa,m, l) each according to∏n
i=1 PV |UA(vi|ui(wa,m), ai(wa)) for l ∈ [1 :
2n(I(V ;X|A,U)+δ)], and distribute them uniformly
at random into 2n(I(V ;X|A,U)−I(V ;Y |A,U)+3δ) bins
bV (m,wv) for wv ∈ [1 : 2n(I(V ;X|A,U)−I(V ;Y |A,U)+3δ)].
Furthermore, for each bin, we divide codewords vn
into 2n(I(V ;Y |A,U)−I(V ;Z|A,U)−δ) equal-sized subbins,
each denoted by a subbin index wk. Without loss of
generality, we can identify the index l = (wv, wk, l′) for
some l′ ∈ [1 : 2n(I(V ;Z|A,U)−δ)].
The codebook is revealed to all parties.
Encoding:
• For a given source sequence xn, the encoder looks for
a an(wa) which is jointly typical with xn. Since there
are more than 2nI(X;A) codewords an, by the covering
lemma [24], there exists such an an with high probability.
If there are more than one, we choose one uniformly
at random and send the corresponding index wa to the
decoder.
• The encoder then looks for a un(wa,m) that is
jointly typical with (xn, an). Since there are more than
2nI(U ;X|A) codewords un, by the covering lemma, there
exists such a un with high probability. If there are more
than one, we choose one uniformly at random and send
the corresponding bin index wu to the decoder.
• Again, the encoder looks for a vn(wa,m, l) which is
jointly typical with (xn, an, un). Since there are more
than 2nI(V ;X|A,U) codewords vn, by the covering lemma,
there exists such a vn with high probability. If there are
more than one, we choose one uniformly at random and
send the corresponding bin index wv to the decoder. The
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secret key k is chosen to be the subbin index wk of the
chosen codeword vn.
This gives the total storage rate of I(X;A) + I(U ;X|A) −
I(U ;Y |A)+I(V ;X|A,U)−I(V ;Y |A,U)+6δ = I(X;A)+
I(V ;X|A, Y ) + 6δ. Once the action sequence is chosen,
action-dependent side information (yn, zn) is generated as the
output of the memoryless channel PY,Z|X,A.
Decoding:
• Upon receiving the indices (wa, wu, wv) and side infor-
mation yn, the decoder looks for the unique un which
is jointly typical with (yn, an). Since there are less than
2nI(U ;Y |A) sequences in the bin bU (wu), by the packing
lemma [24], it will find the unique and correct un with
high probability.
• Then, the decoder looks for the unique vn which is
jointly typical with (yn, an, un). Since there are less than
2nI(V ;Y |A,U) sequences in the bin bV (m,wv), by the
packing lemma, it will find the unique and correct vn with
high probability. The decoder puts out kˆ as the subbin
index wˆk of the decoded codeword vn which will be the
correct one with high probability.
Action Cost: Since each action sequence an is in the typical
set with high probability, by the typical average lemma [24],
the expected cost constraint is satisfied.
Privacy-leakage Rate: The information leakage averaged
over the random codebook Cn can be bounded as
I(Xn;Wa,Wu,Wv, Z
n|Cn)
≤ I(Xn;Wa,M,Wv, Zn|Cn)
= H(Xn|Cn)−H(Xn,Wa,M,Wv, Zn|Cn)
+H(Wa,M,Wv|Cn) +H(Zn|Wa,M,Wv, Cn)
= −H(Zn|Xn, Cn)−H(Wa,M,Wv|Xn, Zn, Cn)
+H(Wa,M,Wv|Cn) +H(Zn|Wa,M,Wv, Cn)
(a)
≤ −H(Zn|Xn, An) +H(Wa,M,Wv|Cn)
+H(Zn|Wa,M,Wv, Cn)
(b)
≤ −H(Zn|Xn, An) +H(Wa|Cn) +H(M |Cn)
+H(Wv|Cn) +H(Zn|An, Un, Cn)
(c)
≤ n[−H(Z|X,A) + I(X;A) + I(U ;X|A) + 5δ
+ (I(V ;X|A,U)− I(V ;Y |A,U)) +H(Z|A,U)]
(d)
= n[I(X;A, V, Y )−I(X;Y |A,U)+I(X;Z|A,U)+δ′]
≤ n[∆ + δ′] (37)
if ∆ ≥ I(X;A, V, Y ) − (I(X;Y |A,U) − I(X;Z|A,U)),
where (a) follows from the facts that conditioning reduces
entropy, and that Zn − (Xn, An) − Cn forms a Markov
chain, (b) follows because given the codebook, (An, Un)
are functions of (Wa,M), (c) follows from the codebook
generation, from the memoryless properties of the source and
the side information channel, from Lemma 5 with which we
bound the term H(Zn|Xn, An), and from Lemma 6 with
which we bound the term H(Zn|An, Un, Cn), and (d) follows
from the Markov chain (Y,Z)− (X,A)− V − U .
Secrecy-leakage Rate: The secrecy-leakage rate averaged
over the random codebook Cn can be bounded as
I(Wk;Wa,Wu,Wv, Z
n|Cn)
≤ H(Wk|Cn)−H(Wk|Wa,M,Wv, Zn, Cn)
= H(Wk|Cn)−H(Wa,M,L, Zn|Cn)
+H(L′|Wa,M,Wv,Wk, Zn, Cn)
+H(Wa,M,Wv, Z
n|Cn)
(a)
≤ H(Wk|Cn)−H(An, Un, V n, Zn|Cn) + nn
+H(Wa|Cn) +H(M |Cn) +H(Wv|Cn)
+H(Zn|An, Un, Cn)
(b)
≤ H(Wk|Cn)−H(An, Un, V n, Zn|Cn) + nn
+ n(I(X;A) + I(U ;X|A) + I(V ;X|A,U, Y )
+H(Z|A,U) + δ′)
(c)
≤ nδ(2) (38)
where (a) follows from the fact that given the code-
book, (An, Un) are functions of (Wa,M) and V n of
(Wa,M,L), and from Fano’s inequality where given
(Wa,M,Wv,Wk, Z
n), the codeword V n and thus L′ can be
decoded correctly with high probability since there are less
than 2nI(V ;Z|A,U) remaining V n, (b) follows from the code-
book generation and Lemma 6, and (c) follows from the code-
book generation, from the bound on H(An, Un, V n, Zn|Cn)
which is shown below, and from the Markov chain U − V −
(X,A)− (Y,Z).
H(An, Un, V n, Zn|Cn)
(a)
= H(An, Un, V n, Xn|Cn) +H(Zn|Xn, An)
−H(Xn|An, Un, V n, Zn, Cn)
≥H(Xn)+H(Zn|Xn, An)−H(Xn|An, Un, V n, Zn, Cn)
(b)
≥ n(H(X) +H(Z|X,A)−H(X|A,U, V, Z)− δ′)
where (a) follows from the Markov chain Zn − (Xn, An)−
(Un, V n, Cn) and (b) follows from Lemma 5 and from a
bound on H(Xn|An, Un, V n, Zn, Cn) which can be derived
similarly as in Lemma 6.
Secret-key Rate: The key rate averaged over the random
codebook Cn can be bounded as follows.
H(Wk|Cn) ≥ H(Wk|Wa,M,Wv, L′, Cn)
(a)
≥ H(An, Un, V n|Cn)−H(Wa|Cn)−H(M |Cn)
−H(Wv|Cn)−H(L′|Cn)
(b)
≥ n(I(X;A,U, V )− I(X;A)− I(U ;X|A)
− I(V ;X|A,U, Y )− I(V ;Z|A,U)− δ′)
= n(I(V ;Y |A,U)−I(V ;Z|A,U)−δ′) ≥ n(Rk − δ′) (39)
if Rk ≤ I(V ;Y |A,U) − I(V ;Z|A,U), where (a) fol-
lows from the fact that given the codebook (An, Un, V n)
are functions of (Wa,M,L), (b) follows from the code-
book generation, from the bound PAnUnV n(an, un, vn) =
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∑
xn∈T (n) (X|an,un,vn) PXn(x
n) ≤ 2−n(I(X;A,U,V )−δ), and
from the Markov chain V − (X,A,U)− Y .
Using the random coding argument, we have that a tuple
(Rk, Rw,∆, C) ∈ R4+ that satisfies (7)-(9) for some PA|X ,
PV |XA, and PU |V such that E[Γ(A)] ≤ C is achievable.
B. Proof of Converse
Let Ui , (W,An\i, Y ni+1, Zi−1) and Vi ,
(W,K,An\i, Y ni+1, Z
i−1), which satisfy the Markov chain
Ui − Vi − (Ai, Xi)− (Yi, Zi) for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n. For any
achievable tuple (Rk, Rw,∆, C), we have the following.
Storage Rate: We obtain
n(Rw + δn) ≥ log |W(n)| ≥ H(W )
(a)
= H(W ) +H(An|W ) = H(An) +H(W |An)
≥ [H(An)−H(An|Xn, Zn)] + [H(W |An, Y n)
−H(W |An, Xn, Y n, Zn)]
=H(Xn, Zn)−H(Xn, Zn|An)+H(Xn, Zn|An, Y n)
−H(Xn, Zn|An, Y n,W )
=H(Xn)+H(Zn|Xn)−H(Y n|An)
+H(Y n, Zn|Xn, An)−H(Zn|Xn, An)
−H(Xn, Zn|An, Y n,W,K)
− I(Xn, Zn;K|An, Y n,W )
≥H(Xn)−H(Y n|An)+H(Y n, Zn|Xn, An)
−H(Xn, Zn|An, Y n,W,K)−H(K|An, Y n,W )
(b)
≥
n∑
i=1
H(Xi)−H(Yi|Ai) +H(Yi, Zi|Xi, Ai)
−H(Xi, Zi|An, Y n,W,K,Xi−1, Zi−1)− nn
(c)
≥
n∑
i=1
H(Xi)−H(Yi|Ai) +H(Yi|Xi, Ai, Zi)
+H(Zi|Xi, Ai)−H(Xi, Zi|Ai, Yi, Vi)− nn
≥
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Ai) + I(Vi;Xi|Ai, Yi)− nn
where (a) follows from the deterministic action encoder, (b)
follows from Fano’s inequality, and (c) follows from the
definition of Vi.
Privacy-leakage Rate: We have
n(∆ + δn) ≥ I(Xn;W,Zn)
= I(Xn;W ) + I(Xn;Zn|W )
(a)
= I(Xn;W,An) + I(Xn;Zn|W,An)
=H(Xn)−H(Xn|W,K,An, Y n)−I(Xn;K|W,An, Y n)
− I(Xn;Y n|W,An) + I(Xn;Zn|W,An)
(b)
≥
n∑
i=1
H(Xi)−H(Xi|W,K,An, Y n, Xi−1)
−H(Yi|W,An, Y ni+1) +H(Yi|Xi, Ai)
+H(Zi|W,An, Zi−1)−H(Zi|Xi, Ai)− nn
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Xi)−H(Xi|W,K,An, Y n, Xi−1, Zi−1)
− I(Xi;Yi|Ai) +H(Yi|Ai) + I(Xi;Zi|Ai)
−H(Zi|Ai)−H(Yi|W,An, Y ni+1)
+H(Zi|W,An, Zi−1)− nn
(d)
≥
n∑
i=1
H(Xi)−H(Xi|Vi, Ai, Yi)− I(Xi;Yi|Ai)
+H(Yi|Ai) + I(Xi;Zi|Ai)−H(Zi|Ai)
−H(Yi|W,An, Y ni+1)+H(Zi|W,An, Zi−1)−nn
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Ai, Vi, Yi)− I(Xi;Yi|Ai) + I(Xi;Zi|Ai)︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Pi
+ I(W,Y ni+1, A
n\i;Yi|Ai)
− I(W,Zi−1, An\i;Zi|Ai)− nn
where (a) follows from the deterministic action encoder,
(b) follows from Fano’s inequality and the Markov chain
(W,K,An\i, Xn\i, Y ni+1, Z
i−1) − (Ai, Xi) − (Yi, Zi), (c)
follows from the Markov chain (Xi,W,K,Ani , Y
n
i ) −
(Ai−1, Xi−1)− (Zi−1, Y i−1), and (d) follows from the defi-
nition of Vi and the deterministic action encoder.
By adding the Csisza´r’s sum identity [25], i.e.,∑n
i=1 I(Yi;Z
i−1|An,W, Y ni+1) − I(Zi;Y ni+1|An,W,Zi−1) =
0, to the right hand side, we get
n(∆ + δn) ≥
n∑
i=1
Pi + I(W,Y
n
i+1, Z
i−1, An\i;Yi|Ai)
− I(W,Y ni+1, Zi−1, An\i;Zi|Ai)− nn
(a)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Ai, Vi, Yi)− I(Xi;Yi|Ai) + I(Xi;Zi|Ai)
+ I(Ui;Yi|Ai)− I(Ui;Zi|Ai)− nn
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Ai, Vi, Yi)− I(Xi;Yi|Ui, Ai)
+ I(Xi;Zi|Ui, Ai)− nn,
where (a) follows from the definitions of Pi and Ui and (b)
from the Markov chain Ui − (Ai, Xi)− (Yi, Zi).
Secret-key Rate: We obtain
n(Rk − δn) ≤ H(K)
(a)
≤ H(K|W,Zn) + nδn
(b)
= H(K|W,An, Zn) + nδn
(c)
≤ H(K|W,An, Zn)−H(K|W,An, Y n) + 2nδn
=
n∑
i=1
I(K;Yi|W,An, Y ni+1)− I(K;Zi|W,An, Zi−1) + 2nδn
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
I(K;Yi|W,An, Y ni+1, Zi−1)
− I(K;Zi|W,An, Y ni+1, Zi−1) + 2nδn
(e)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Vi;Yi|Ai, Ui)−I(Vi;Zi|Ai, Ui)+2nδn (40)
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where (a) follows by (2), (b) follows from the deterministic
action encoder, (c) follows from Fano’s inequality, (d) fol-
lows from Csisza´r’s sum identity, and (e) follows from the
definitions of Ui and Vi.
Action Cost: We have
C + δn ≥ E
[
Γ(n)(An)
]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[
Γ(Ai)
]
. (41)
Finally, we complete the proof by the standard time-sharing
argument and letting δn → 0.
Cardinality Bounds: It can be shown by using the
support lemma [25] that U should have |X ||A| − 1
elements to preserve PXA and three more to pre-
serve H(X|U, V,A, Y ), I(X;Z|A,U) − I(X;Y |A,U), and
I(V ;Y |A,U) − I(V ;Z|A,U). Similarly, the cardinality |V|
can be limited to at most (|X ||A|+ 2)(|X ||A|+ 1).
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
C. Proof of Achievability
Fix PA|X , PV |XA, and PU |V such that E[Γ(A)] ≤ C/(1 +
). We use the achievability proof of Theorem 1. Suppose the
key K ′ = Wk′ , generated as in the generated-secret model,
has the same cardinality as the embedded key K = Wk, i.e.,
|K′| = |K|. Consider an encoder f (n)2 with inputs (Xn,K) and
outputs W = (K ′+K,W ′). Similarly, consider a decoder g(n)
with inputs (Y n,W ) and output Kˆ = K ′ + K − Kˆ ′, where
the addition and subtraction operations are modulo-|K|. The
decoder of the generated-secret model is used at the decoder
to obtain Kˆ ′.
Error Probability: We have
Pr[K 6= Kˆ] = Pr[K ′ 6= Kˆ ′] (42)
which is small due to the proof of achievability for the
generated-secret model.
Action Cost: Similar to the generated-secret model, one can
show that the expected cost constraint is satisfied with high
probability by using the typical average lemma.
Privacy-leakage Rate: We obtain
I(Xn;Wa′ ,Wu′ ,Wv′ ,Wk +Wk′ , Z
n|Cn)
= I(Xn;Wa′ ,Wu′ ,Wv′ , Z
n|Cn)
+ I(Xn;Wk +Wk′ |Wa′ ,Wu′ ,Wv′ , Zn, Cn)
≤ I(Xn;Wa′ ,Wu′ ,Wv′ , Zn|Cn)
+H(Wk +Wk′ |Wa′ ,Wu′ ,Wv′ , Zn, Cn)
−H(Wk +Wk′ |Wa′ ,Wu′ ,Wv′ , Zn, Xn,Wk′ , Cn)
(a)
≤ I(Xn;Wa′ ,Wu′ ,Wv′ , Zn|Cn) + log |K| −H(Wk)
(b)
≤ n[I(X;A, V, Y )−(I(X;Y |A,U)−I(X;Z|A,U))+δ′]
≤ n[∆ + δ′]
if ∆ ≥ I(X;A, V, Y ) − (I(X;Y |A,U) − I(X;Z|A,U)),
where (a) follows because the embedded key K = Wk is
independent of other random variables and (b) follows from
uniformity of Wk and (37).
Secrecy-leakage Rate: Observe that
I(Wk;Wa′ ,Wu′ ,Wv′ ,Wk +Wk′ , Z
n|Cn)
= I(Wk;Wa′ ,Wu′ ,Wv′ , Z
n|Cn)
+ I(Wk;Wk +Wk′ |Wa′ ,Wu′ ,Wv′ , Zn, Cn)
(a)
= H(Wk +Wk′ |Wa′ ,Wu′ ,Wv′ , Zn, Cn)
−H(Wk′ |Wa′ ,Wu′ ,Wv′ , Zn, Cn)
≤ log |K| −H(Wk′) + I(Wk′ ;Wa′ ,Wu′ ,Wv′ , Zn|Cn)
(b)
≤ n(δn + δ(2) )
where (a) follows because K = Wk is independent of other
random variables and (b) follows by (38) and (39).
Secret-key Rate: We have
H(Wk|Cn) = log |K| ≥ H(Wk′ |Cn)
(a)
≥ n(I(V ;Y |A,U)−I(V ;Z|A,U)−δ′)≥n(Rk−δ′) (43)
if Rk ≤ I(V ;Y |A,U)− I(V ;Z|A,U), where (a) follows by
(39).
Storage Rate: The storage rate is the sum of the storage Rw′
for the generated-secret model and for K ′ +K. We obtain
Rw ≤ Rw′ + 1
n
log |K|
(a)
= I(X,A) + I(V ;X|A, Y ) + 6δ +Rk
(b)
≤ I(X,A) + I(V ;X|A, Y ) + 6δ
+ I(V ;Y |A,U)− I(V ;Z|A,U)
(c)
= I(X;A, V )− I(U ;Y |A)− I(V ;Z|A,U) + 6δ
where (a) follows from the storage rate of the generated-secret
model, (b) follows by (43), and (c) follows from the Markov
chain U − V − (X,A)− (Y,Z).
Using the random coding argument, we have that a tuple
(Rk, Rw,∆, C) ∈ R4+ that satisfies (10)-(12) for some PA|X ,
PV |XA, and PU |V such that E[Γ(A)]≤C is achievable.
D. Proof of Converse
Use the definitions of Ui and Vi given in Appendix B so
that Ui − Vi − (Ai, Xi)− (Yi, Zi) forms a Markov chain for
all i = 1, 2, . . . , n. The main step is the proof of converse for
the storage rate.
Secret-key Rate: Use similar steps as in (40) to obtain
Rk≤ 1
n
[ n∑
i=1
I(Vi;Yi|Ai, Ui)−I(Vi;Zi|Ai, Ui)+3nδn
]
.
Action Cost: Similar to Appendix B, we obtain (41) for the
expected cost constraint.
Privacy-leakage Rate: We apply similar steps as in Ap-
pendix B and obtain
∆ ≥ 1
n
[ n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Vi, Ai, Yi)− I(Xi;Yi|Ui, Ai)
+ I(Xi;Zi|Ui, Ai)− nn − nδn
]
.
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Storage Rate: We have
n(Rw + δn) ≥ log |W(n)| ≥ H(W )
(a)
= H(W ) +H(An|W ) = H(An) +H(W |An)
(b)
≥ H(An)−H(An|Xn, Zn) +H(An|Xn, Zn)
+H(W |An, Y n)−H(W |An, Xn, Y n, Zn)
+H(W |An, Xn)
= H(Xn, Zn)−H(Xn, Zn|An) +H(An|Xn, Zn)
+H(Xn, Zn|An, Y n)−H(Xn, Zn|An, Y n,W )
+H(W |An, Xn)
= H(Xn) +H(Zn|Xn)−H(Y n|An)
+H(Y n, Zn|Xn, An)−H(Zn|Xn, An)
+H(An|Xn, Zn)−H(Xn, Zn|An, Y n,W,K)
− I(Xn, Zn;K|An, Y n,W ) +H(W |An, Xn)
= H(Xn) + I(Zn;An|Xn)−H(Y n|An)
+H(Y n, Zn|Xn, An) +H(An|Xn, Zn)
−H(Xn, Zn|An, Y n,W,K)−H(K|An, Y n,W )
+H(K|An, Y n,W,Xn, Zn) +H(W |An, Xn)
(c)
=H(Xn)+H(W,An,K|Xn)−H(Y n|An)
+H(Y n, Zn|Xn, An)−H(Xn, Zn|An, Y n,W,K)
−H(K|An, Y n,W )
(d)
≥H(Xn)+H(K)−H(Y n|An)+H(Y n, Zn|Xn, An)
−H(Xn, Zn|An, Y n,W,K)−H(K|An, Y n,W )
≥ H(Xn)−H(Y n|An) +H(Y n, Zn|Xn, An)
−H(Xn, Zn|An, Y n,W,K)
+H(K|An, Zn,W )−H(K|An, Y n,W )
≥
n∑
i=1
H(Xi)−H(Yi|Ai) +H(Yi, Zi|Xi, Ai)
−H(Xi, Zi|An, Y n,W,K,Xi−1, Zi−1)
+ I(K;Yi|W,An, Y ni+1)− I(K;Zi|W,An, Zi−1)
(e)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Xi)−H(Yi|Ai) +H(Yi, Zi|Xi, Ai)
−H(Xi, Zi|An, Y n,W,K,Xi−1, Zi−1)
+ I(K;Yi|W,An, Y ni+1, Zi−1)
− I(K;Zi|W,An, Y ni+1, Zi−1)
(f)
≥
n∑
i=1
H(Xi)−H(Yi|Ai) +H(Yi|Xi, Ai, Zi)
+H(Zi|Xi, Ai)−H(Xi, Zi|Ai, Yi, Vi)
+ I(Vi;Yi|Ai, Ui)− I(Vi;Zi|Ai, Ui)
≥
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Ai) + I(Vi;Xi|Yi, Ai) + I(Vi;Yi|Ai, Ui)
− I(Vi;Zi|Ai, Ui)
(g)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Ai, Vi)− I(Ui;Yi|Ai)− I(Vi;Zi|Ai, Ui)
where (a) follows from the deterministic action encoder, (b)
follows from the Markov chain W − (An, Xn) − (Y n, Zn),
(c) follows from the Markov chain (K,W ) − (An, Xn) −
(Y n, Zn), (d) follows because the embedded key K is inde-
pendent of Xn, and (e) follows from Csisza´r’s sum identity.
We use the definitions of Ui and Vi in (f), and (g) follows
because Ui − Vi − (Ai, Xi)− (Yi, Zi) forms a Markov chain
for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
The converse follows by applying the standard time-sharing
argument and letting δn → 0.
Cardinality Bounds: We use the support lemma and satisfy
the Markov condition U −V − (A,X)− (Y,Z). We therefore
preserve PXA by using |X ||A| − 1 elements. The bound in
(11) for the storage rate can be written as
I(X;A, V )− I(U ;Y |A)− I(V ;Z|A,U)
= I(X;A)+I(V ;X|A, Y )+I(V ;Y |A,U)−I(V ;Z|A,U).
We thus have to preserve three more expressions, i.e.,
I(V ;Y |A,U) − I(V ;Z|A,U), H(X|U, V,A, Y ), and
I(X;Z|A,U) − I(X;Y |A,U). One can therefore preserve
all expressions in Theorem 2 by using an auxiliary random
variable U with |U| ≤ |X ||A| + 2 and, similarly, V with
|V| ≤ (|X ||A|+ 2)(|X ||A|+ 1).
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
E. Proof of Achievability
Consider the codebook generation, encoding, and decoding
steps of the generated-secret model with a visible source. Fix
PA|X˜ , PV |X˜A, and PU |V such that E[Γ(A)] ≤ C/(1 + ).
We apply the steps in Appendix A after replacing every X
with X˜ and every realization xn with x˜n. These replacements
guarantee that (X˜n, An, Un, V n, Y n) are jointly typical with
high probability due to standard arguments used in Ap-
pendix A for error analysis. Markov lemma [24] then ensures
that (Xn, X˜n, An, Un, V n, Y n) are also jointly typical with
high probability.
Action Cost: The typical average lemma shows that the
expected cost constraint is satisfied with high probability.
Storage Rate: After replacing X with X˜ in Appendix A,
the total storage rate in this case is Rw = I(X˜, A) +
I(V ; X˜|A, Y )+6δ because U−V −(A, X˜)−(A,X)−(Y,Z)
forms a Markov chain.
Privacy-leakage Rate: Consider the leakage about the hid-
den source averaged over the random codebook Cn.
I(Xn;Wa,Wu,Wv, Z
n|Cn)
≤ I(Xn;Wa,Wu,M ′,Wv, Zn|Cn)
= I(Xn;Wa,M,Wv, Z
n|Cn)
= H(Xn|Cn)−H(Xn,Wa,M,Wv, Zn|Cn)
+H(Wa,M,Wv|Cn) +H(Zn|Wa,M,Wv, Cn)
(a)
= −H(Zn|Xn, Cn)−H(Wa, An,M,Wv|Xn, Zn, Cn)
+H(Wa,M,Wv|Cn) +H(Zn|Wa,M,Wv, Cn)
= −H(Zn|Xn, An, Cn)− I(An;Zn|Xn, Cn)
−H(An|Xn, Zn,Cn)−H(Wa,M,Wv|Xn, Zn, An,Cn)
+H(Wa,M,Wv|Cn) +H(Zn|Wa,M,Wv, Cn)
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(b)
= −H(Zn|Xn, An)−H(An|Xn, Cn)
−H(Wa,M,Wv,W |Xn, Zn, An, Cn)
+H(Wa,M,Wv|Cn) +H(Zn|Wa,M,Wv, Cn)
= −H(Zn|Xn, An)−H(An|Xn, Cn)
−H(Wa,M,Wv,W, V n|Xn, Zn, An, Cn)
+H(V n|Xn, Zn, An,Wa,M,Wv,W, Cn)
+H(Wa,M,Wv|Cn) +H(Zn|Wa,M,Wv, Cn)
(c)
≤ −H(Zn|Xn, An)−H(An|Xn, Cn)
−H(V n|Xn, Zn, An, Cn)+nn+H(Wa,M,Wv|Cn)
+H(Zn|Wa,M,Wv, Cn)
(d)
≤ −H(Zn|Xn, An)−H(V n, An|Xn, Cn)+H(Wa|Cn)
+H(M |Cn)+H(Wv|Cn)+H(Zn|An, Un, Cn)+nn
(e)
≤−H(Zn|Xn, An)−n[H(V,A|X)−H(V,A|X˜)−2δ]
+H(Wa|Cn)+H(M |Cn)+H(Wv|Cn)
+H(Zn|An, Un, Cn) + nn
(f)
≤ −n[H(Z|X,A)−H(V,A|X) +H(V,A|X˜) + 7δ
+ I(X˜;A) + I(X˜;U |A)+I(V ; X˜|A,U)
−I(V ;Y |A,U)+H(Z|A,U) + n]
(g)
= n[I(X˜;V,A)−H(V,A|X) +H(V,A|X˜)
−I(V ;Y |A,U) + I(X;Z|A,U) + δ(3) ]
= n[I(X;V,A)−I(V ;Y |A,U)+I(X;Z|A,U)+δ(3) ]
(h)
= n[I(X;A, V, Y )−(I(X;Y |A,U)−I(X;Z|A,U))+δ(3) ]
≤ n[∆ + δ(3) ] (44)
if ∆ ≥ I(X;A, V, Y ) − (I(X;Y |A,U) − I(X;Z|A,U)),
where (a) follows since given Cn, Wa determines An,
(b) follows since Zn− (Xn, An)−Cn forms a Markov chain
and (Wa,Wu,Wv) determine the helper data W ,
(c) follows from the Markov chain V n−(Xn, An,W, Cn)−Y n
and Fano’s inequality applied as
H(V n|Xn, Zn, An,Wa,M,Wv,W, Cn)
≤H(V n|Xn, An,W, Cn)≤H(V n|Y n, An,W, Cn)≤nn,
(d) follows from the Markov chain V n − (Xn, An, Cn)−Zn
and from the facts that given the codebook, Wa determines
An and (Wa,M) determine Un,
(e) follows from the following inequality
H(V n, An|Xn, Cn)
= H(An|Xn, Cn) +H(V n|Xn, An, X˜n, Cn)
+ I(V n; X˜n|Xn, An, Cn)
≥ H(X˜n, An|Xn, Cn)−H(X˜n|Xn, An, V n, Cn)
(a)
≥ H(X˜n|Xn)−H(X˜n|Xn, An, V n, Cn)
(b)
≥ n[H(X˜|X)−H(X˜|X,A, V )− 2δ]
(c)
= n[H(V,A|X)−H(V,A|X˜)− 2δ]
where (a) follows since X˜n − Xn − Cn forms a Markov
chain, (b) follows by applying Lemma 5 to bound the
term H(X˜n|Xn) and Lemma 6 to bound the term
H(X˜n|Xn, An, V n, Cn), and (c) follows due to the Markov
chain (V,A)− X˜ −X ,
(f) follows from the codebook generation, from the memo-
ryless property of the source and side information channels,
from Lemma 5 applied to H(Zn|Xn, An), and from Lemma 6
applied to H(Zn|An, Un, Cn),
(g) follows from the Markov chains U − (V,A) − X˜ and
U − (A,X)− Z,
(h) follows from the Markov chain U − V − (A,X)− Y .
Secrecy-leakage Rate: The secrecy-leakage rate analysis
follows by replacing every Xn in Appendix A with X˜n when
bounding the term H(An, Un, V n, Zn|Cn) since, this time,
(Un, V n, Cn)− (An, X˜n)−Zn and U −V − (A, X˜)− (Y,Z)
form Markov chains. Use
H(Zn|X˜n, An, Cn)
= H(Zn|X˜n, An, Xn, Cn) + I(Zn;Xn|X˜n, An, Cn)
(a)
= H(Zn|An, Xn)+H(Xn|X˜n)−H(Xn|X˜n,An, Zn,Cn)
(b)
≥ n(H(Z|A,X)+H(X|X˜)−2δ)−H(Xn|X˜n,An,Zn,Cn)
(c)
≥ n(H(Z|A,X)+H(X|X˜, A)−H(X|X˜, A, Z)−3δ)
(d)
= n(H(Z|X˜, A)− 3δ)
where (a) follows because Zn − (An, Xn) − (X˜n, Cn) and
Xn − X˜n − (An, Cn) form Markov chains, (b) follows by
applying Lemma 5 to bound the terms H(Zn|An, Xn) and
H(Xn|X˜n) because Zn is i.i.d. ∼ PZ|XA and Xn is i.i.d.
∼ PX|X˜ , (c) follows from the Markov chain X−X˜−A and by
applying Lemma 6 to bound the term H(Xn|X˜n, An, Zn, Cn),
and (d) follows from the Markov chain Z − (A,X)− X˜ . We
thus obtain
I(Wk;Wa,Wu,Wv, Z
n|Cn) ≤ nδ(4) . (45)
Secret-key Rate: Using the codebook generation in Ap-
pendix A and the fact that now V − (A, X˜, U) − Y forms
a Markov chain, it is straightforward to show that
H(Wk|Cn) ≥ n[I(V ;Y |A,U)− I(Y ;Z|A,U)− δ(3) ]
≥ n(Rk − δ(3) ) (46)
if Rk ≤ I(V ;Y |A,U)− I(V ;Z|A,U).
Using the random coding argument, we have that a tuple
(Rk, Rw,∆, C) ∈ R4+ that satisfies (13)-(15) for some PA|X˜ ,
PV |X˜A, and PU |V such that E[Γ(A)]≤C is achievable.
F. Proof of Converse
Use the definitions of Ui and Vi given in Appendix B so
that Ui−Vi− (Ai, X˜i)− (Ai, Xi)− (Yi, Zi) forms a Markov
chain for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
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Storage Rate: Replace every Xn with X˜n and every Xi with
X˜i for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n in Appendix B and apply similar
steps to obtain
Rw≥ 1
n
[ n∑
i=1
I(X˜i;Ai)+I(Vi; X˜i|Ai, Yi)−nn−nδn
]
.
Privacy-leakage Rate: We apply similar steps as in
Appendix B. It is also straightforward to show that
(W,K,An\i, Xn\i, Y ni+1, Z
i−1) − (Ai, Xi) − (Yi, Zi),
(Xi,W,K,A
n
i , Y
n
i ) − (Ai−1, Xi−1) − (Zi−1, Y i−1), and
Ui − (Ai, Xi) − (Yi, Zi) form Markov chains for all
i = 1, 2, . . . , n also for a hidden source. We thus obtain
∆ ≥ 1
n
[ n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Ai, Vi, Yi)− I(Xi;Yi|Ai, Ui)
+ I(Xi;Zi|Ai, Ui)− nn − nδn
]
.
Secret-key Rate: The converse is similar to the converse for
a visible source with the generated-secret model. By applying
similar steps as in Appendix B, we obtain
Rk≤ 1
n
[ n∑
i=1
I(Vi;Yi|Ai, Ui)−I(Vi;Zi|Ai, Ui)+3nδn
]
.
Action Cost: We obtain (41) for the expected cost constraint.
The converse follows by applying the standard time-sharing
argument and letting δn → 0.
Cardinality Bounds: We use the support lemma and satisfy
the Markov condition U − V − (A, X˜) − (A,X) − (Y, Z),
so we preserve PX˜A by using |X˜ ||A| − 1 real-valued con-
tinuous functions. We have to preserve four more expres-
sions, i.e., I(V ;Y |A,U) − I(V ;Z|A,U), H(X˜|U, V,A, Y ),
H(X|U, V,A, Y ), and I(X;Z|A,U) − I(X;Y |A,U). One
can therefore preserve all expressions in Theorem 3 by using
an auxiliary random variable U with |U| ≤ |X ||A| + 3 and,
similarly, V with |V| ≤ (|X ||A|+ 3)(|X ||A|+ 2).
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
G. Proof of Achievability
Fix PA|X˜ , PV |X˜A, and PU |V such that E[Γ(A)] ≤ C/(1 +
). We use the achievability proof of Theorem 3. Suppose the
key K ′ = Wk′ generated as in the generated-secret model for
a hidden source has the same cardinality as the embedded key
K = Wk, i.e., |K′| = |K|. Consider an encoder f (n)4 with
inputs (X˜n,K) and outputs W = (K ′ + K,W ′). Similarly,
consider a decoder g(n) with inputs (Y n,W ) and output Kˆ =
K ′ +K − Kˆ ′, where the addition and subtraction operations
are modulo-|K|. Note that the decoder of the generated-secret
model for a hidden source is used at the decoder to obtain Kˆ ′.
Error Probability: We obtain (42), which is small due to
the proof of achievability for Theorem 3.
Action Cost: Similar to Appendix E, one can show that the
expected cost constraint is satisfied with high probability by
using the typical average lemma.
Privacy-leakage Rate: We have
I(Xn;Wa′ ,Wu′ ,Wv′ ,Wk +Wk′ , Z
n|Cn)
≤ I(Xn;Wa′ ,Wu′ ,Wv′ , Zn|Cn) + log |K|
−H(Wk +Wk′ |Wa′ ,Wu′ ,Wv′ , Zn, Xn,Wk′ , Cn)
(a)
≤ n[I(X;A, V, Y )−(I(X;Y |A,U)−I(X;Z|A,U))+δ(3) ]
≤ n[∆ + δ(3) ]
if ∆ ≥ I(X;A, V, Y ) − (I(X;Y |A,U) − I(X;Z|A,U)),
where (a) follows because K = Wk is independent of other
random variables, and from uniformity of Wk and (44).
Secrecy-leakage Rate: We obtain
I(Wk;Wa′ ,Wu′ ,Wv′ ,Wk +Wk′ , Z
n|Cn)
= I(Wk;Wa′ ,Wu′ ,Wv′ , Z
n|Cn)
+ I(Wk;Wk +Wk′ |Wa′ ,Wu′ ,Wv′ , Zn, Cn)
(a)
= H(Wk +Wk′ |Wa′ ,Wu′ ,Wv′ , Zn, Cn)
−H(Wk′ |Wa′ ,Wu′ ,Wv′ , Zn, Cn)
≤ log |K| −H(Wk′) + I(Wk′ ;Wa′ ,Wu′ ,Wv′ , Zn|Cn)
(b)
≤ n(δn + δ(4) )
where (a) follows because K = Wk is independent of other
random variables and (b) follows by (45) and (46).
Secret-key Rate: Observe that
H(Wk|Cn) = log |K| ≥ H(Wk′ |Cn)
(a)
≥ n(I(Y ;V |A,U)− I(Z;V |A,U)− δ(3) )
≥ n(Rk − δ(3) ) (47)
if Rk ≤ I(V ;Y |A,U)− I(V ;Z|A,U), where (a) follows by
(46).
Storage Rate: The storage rate is the sum of the storage
Rw′ for a hidden source with the generated-secret model and
for K ′ +K. We obtain
Rw ≤ Rw′ + 1
n
log |K|
(a)
= I(X˜, A) + I(V ; X˜|A, Y ) + 6δ +Rk
(b)
≤ I(X˜, A) + I(V ; X˜|A, Y ) + 6δ
+ I(V ;Y |A,U)− I(V ;Z|A,U)
(c)
= I(X˜;A, V )− I(U ;Y |A)− I(V ;Z|A,U) + 6δ
where (a) follows from the storage rate for a hidden source
with the generated-secret model, (b) follows by (47), and (c)
follows from the Markov chain U − V − (A, X˜)− (Y, Z).
Using the random coding argument, we have that a tuple
(Rk, Rw,∆, C) ∈ R4+ that satisfies (16)-(18) for some PA|X˜ ,
PV |X˜A, and PU |V such that E[Γ(A)]≤C is achievable.
H. Proof of Converse
Use the definitions of Ui and Vi given in Appendix B so
that Ui−Vi− (Ai, X˜i)− (Ai, Xi)− (Yi, Zi) forms a Markov
chain for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
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Secret-key Rate: The converse for the secret-key rate is
similar to the converse for a hidden source with the generated-
secret model. We obtain
Rk≤ 1
n
[ n∑
i=1
I(Vi;Yi|Ai, Ui)−I(Vi;Zi|Ai, Ui)+3nδn
]
.
Action Cost: Similar to Appendix F, we obtain (41) for the
expected cost constraint.
Privacy-leakage Rate: We apply similar steps
to Appendix F. It is straightforward to show that
(W,K,An\i, Xn\i, Y ni+1, Z
i−1) − (Ai, Xi) − (Yi, Zi),
(Xi,W,K,A
n
i , Y
n
i ) − (Ai−1, Xi−1) − (Zi−1, Y i−1), and
Ui − (Ai, Xi) − (Yi, Zi) form Markov chains for all
i = 1, 2, . . . , n also for a hidden source and an embedded
secret key K. We thus obtain
∆ ≥ 1
n
[ n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Ai, Vi, Yi)− I(Xi;Yi|Ai, Ui)
+ I(Xi;Zi|Ai, Ui)− nn − nδn
]
.
Storage Rate: This time, we apply similar steps as in
Appendix D. Replace every sequence Xn with X˜n and every
Xi with X˜i for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Using similar steps as in
Appendix D, and the facts that Ui − Vi − (Ai, X˜i)− (Yi, Zi)
for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n and (K,W ) − (An, X˜n) − (Y n, Zn)
form Markov chains, we obtain
Rw ≥ 1
n
[ n∑
i=1
I(X˜i;Ai, Vi)− I(Ui;Yi|Ai)
− I(Vi;Zi|Ai, Ui)− nδn
]
.
The converse follows by applying the standard time-sharing
argument and letting δn → 0.
Cardinality Bounds: We use the support lemma. One has to
satisfy the Markov condition U−V −(A, X˜)−(A,X)−(Y, Z).
We therefore preserve PX˜A by using |X˜ ||A| − 1 real-valued
continuous functions. The bound in (17) can be written as
I(X˜;A, V )− I(U ;Y |A)− I(V ;Z|A,U)
= I(X˜;A)+I(X˜;V |A, Y )+I(V ;Y |A,U)−I(V ;Z|A,U).
We therefore have to preserve four more expressions,
i.e., I(V ;Y |A,U) − I(V ;Z|A,U), H(X˜|U, V,A, Y ),
H(X|U, V,A, Y ), and I(X;Z|A,U) − I(X;Y |A,U). One
can therefore preserve all expressions in Theorem 4 by using
an auxiliary random variable U with |U| ≤ |X ||A| + 3 and,
similarly, V with |V| ≤ (|X ||A|+ 3)(|X ||A|+ 2).
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